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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BONNYE V. HOOPER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Civil

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant and Respondent.

No. 7887

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's statement of facts is so brief as to be
of little value to the court in its consideration of the law
points involved in the appeal. On the main point in
issue it is contradictory. On the first page of the brief
they state that the left rear wheel on the truck was
defectively manufactured. On page 6 they state that
there was a conflict in the evidence as to whether or not
the left rear wheel was defective and as to whether or
not the defect caused the accident in question. Viewing
the evidence most favorably from plaintiff's side, there
1
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was a conflict but the jury decided that issue against
plaintiff's contention, so on this appeal we must consider
the evidence as havjng established the fact that it was
not defectively manufactured by defendant, and the only
questions on this appeal are as to whether the trial court
committed prejudicial error in its instructions to the
jury and in its rulings as to the admissibility of the
evidence submitted to the jury. The weight of the evidence to sustain the jury finding is not raised by the
appeal.
In order to understand the rulings it is important
to know the issues raised by the pleadings and the
theories upon which the case was tried by the parties.
The following facts are not in dispute :
Plaintiff and Beverly Hooper, son of plaintiff, purchased the truck in question from Hyland Motor Company, Ely, Nevada, on July 21, 1951 (R. 120); it was a
new truck manufactured or assembled by defendant; it
had been driven a little over 6700 miles at the time of
the accident; the accident happened on the evening of
October 15, 1951 on Newark Valley Highway, a graveled
road, while plaintiff was driving in a southwesterly
direction about six or seven miles north of the intersection with U. S. Highway 50. Plaintiff was alone in
the truck at the time of the accident; the truck rolled
over two times, pinning plaintiff's foot beneath the upset
vehicle, where she remained until discovered by a Mrs.
Stinnett, who summoned help from a group of men who

2
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were playing cards at her home (R. 145); when they
arrived the truck was facing nortlnn\sterly on the highway (the opposite direction from that in which it was
travelling before the accident) (R. 147), and was badly
damaged. The extent and character of the car damage,
the physical characteristics of the highway near the scene
of the accident, and the marks on and off the highway
made by the truck prior to the upset, as testified to by
those who saw them, were the main elements from which
the expert witnesses for plaintiff and defendant gave
their opinions as to what did or did not occur prior to
and in the accident and as to what was the condition of
the wheel before the accident. Those facts ·will be more
fully discussed in considering the alleged errors.
Plaintiff's theory, as set forth in the complaint, was
that the left rear wheel was weak, inadequate and defective when manufactured by defendant and put on the
market, and that it should have discovered such fact by
proper inspection (R. 2). By interrogatory 1 (R. 8)
plaintiff was requested to set forth the particular defects
that were claimed and she answered (R. 10) that she
claimed improper design of the wheel, defective workmanship, improperly installed rivets, improper rivet
holes, defective materials, missing rivets, loose rivets
and rivets of improper quality. Those broad issues were
further reduced and limited by the evidence as actua11y
presented in the testimony of Mr. Curtis, an expert
witness, who asserted there were physical facts on the
rim which indicated the presence of three loose rivets
before the accident, which, in his opinion, caused the
3
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accident (R. 185). Defendant denied this and presented
what the jury believed to be the correct explanation of
the accident.
Plaintiff testified that she left the ranch at 6 :05 on
the evening of October 15, 1951 (R. 121) to go to Eureka,
Nevada, to attend Lodge and pick up some grain and
groceries. It was not yet dark. About eight miles from
the ranch she turned on the headlights. She was driving
southerly on the Newark Valley Highway in the center
of the road (R. 122). About seven miles north of the
junction of the road with U. S. Highway 50 she passed
a large mountain lion and she says, ''I told the mountain
lion not for it to be there when I came back, because if
I happened to have a flat tire on the trip, I wouldn't
like to be changing it around him." She had just gone
a short distance past the lion when she said the left rear
end of the pickup dropped suddenly, down, and it
swerved to the left and she tried to right it to the right
and it went end for end, and it seemed to be somewhat
going to the right front of the fender, when it went over.
She said she was travelling in the center of the road
at the time (R. 122). Up to that time she noticeclnothing
unusual or wrong with the truck (R. 123). She said she
was driving at about 30 miles per hour (R. 127); that
the truck did not go off the left side of the road after
it dropped down and swerved to the left (R. 127); she
couldn't tell in inches how far it dropped but it was
greater than a flat tire (R. 141). The rear end pulled to
the left (R. 142). She turned the steering wheel to the

4
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right: and it ,\·n~ tlwn that thl' trurk startc'd tippiuo-b
over (R. 143) and skidded along the highway on its side.
~

Plaintiff called witnesses Beverly Hooper and Dan
Milovich, both of whom testified as to the physical facts
and the marks on the highway as they found them when
they '?isited the scene of the accident that night or the
next day. They both testified as to the nature of the
damage to the truck, particularly as to the condition of
the left rear wheel, the spider and the rim, the rivets
and the fact that after the truck had been moved off the
highway the rim was separated from the spider.
Beverly Hooper testified that he visited the scene of
the accident the afternoon of the next day. The truc-k
was still where it had been left by Mr. Stinnett, Toad
Rice, Lloyd Rickets, Ray Starling and Dan Milovich
when they moved it off the center of the highway the
night before (R. 63). The spider or inside of the wheel
was still bolted to the hub ; the tire and rim were in the
back of the truck. He identified the spider Exhibit "A",
rim Exhibit '' B'' and tire Exhibit '' C' ', and they were
received in evidence. He removed the spider from the
drum. All of the nuts were tight. He looked inside the
rim and saw the worn, shiny spots that are there (R. 67).
All of the windows in the truck were broken except one
small pane on the right door, the right fender was
smashed inwards and backwards ; the hood was smashed;
the top of the cab was smashed; the left door was smashed
back out and around; the frame on the left side was bent
quite badly under the cab (R. 68). The shock absorber
5
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-----------------.._

..

housing was scarred and marked up; the shock absorber
hanger was bent upwards; the main leaf of the left rear
spring was bent up; and there were scars on the spring
front and back (R. 63). See Exhibits "D" and "E"
(photographs). There was a tire mark on the back inside
of the left rear fender (R. 70). See Ex. "G".
The tire (Ex. C) was never dismounted from the rim
(Ex. B) until they were dismounted in December of 1951
(R. 92). There was a tear in the tube about six to eight
inches from the valve stem just above the bent place on
the rim. The tear did not go through (R. 95). He did
not observe any heads of rivets inside the tire (R. 95).
After the accident both the rim and spider were
distorted and separated from each other ( R. 67). There
was a dent in the outside of the rim and there were bends
on the inside (R. 67). The spider (center of the wheel)
was still on the truck but was distorted (Ex. "A") near
the scarring or scuffed portion (R. 218-220).
The tire on the left rear wheel was blown out and
flat (R. 267).
The truck had had extensive use since its purchase:
from the ranch to Eureka (R. 86-87); to Los Angeles (R.
87); from the ranch to the McDougall ranch (R. 87);
hauling horses (R. 88); between the ranch and the top
of the field (R. 89) ; had been equipped with a hitch to
draw a horse trailer (R. 96); and had been used to haul
deer hunters to the hunting ground (R. 96).
6
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Several \vitnesses testified as to the marks on and
off the highway after the accident. One of them was a
1\Ir. Stinnett (one of the men summoned for help by Mrs.
Stinnett after the accident and who was brought to Salt
Lake City as a ·witness for plaintiff, but not called by
her and then called as a witness for defendant). He saw
the tracks made by the truck immediately after the accident and said they were off the crown of the road on the
east side (R. 25 7-258) extending north from a point
about 50 feet from "·here the truck came back on the
road and overturned. He marked the tracks on Exhibit
7 and identified the location on the photograph Exhibit
"1" where the stake is on the photograph, as the place
where the truck came back on the highway (R. 259). The
mark off the highway was about 30 feet long. It was a
fresh mark and led to the place where the truck came
back on the road and over-turned (R. 250). He testified
that when the four men were pulling the truck up the
highway to the cut to the north after the accident to get
it off the road that they did not get over near the right
(east) shoulder (R. 266). "We pulled the pickup right
on the gravel road.'' (R. 266). The track off the road
was not made by the spider (R. 268). The fill is about
45° slope (R. 269) and about 3 feet to the ground level.
The mark was about a foot below the crown of the
highway (R. 270). He saw no other tracks than the one
off the road and the one they made up the road when
they pulled the truck.
A photograph of the fill at this point (Ex. "1") was
introduced in evidence. It shows the nature of the fill

7
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material as containing rocks and boulders. The fill
material obviously came from the cut, as is usual in road
construction. Beverly Hooper also identified the area
and testified that the rocks and boulders shown in the
photograph are there and might have rolled off as the
work of making the fill was being done. (R. 106-107).
rrhe spider and rim are the two component parts of
the wheel. Both were manufactured for defendant by
Norse Thermidor Company. The spider is the central
part and takes the place of spokes. By great pressure
the spider is forced inside the rim, after which four sets
of rivets, in groups of three, are inserted in holes which
have been punched in the rim and tire combination in
one process (R. 289-291). In punching the holes for the
rivets the direction is from the rim into the spider so
that th~ edge of rim hole forms a cone and flows down
into the hole in the spider (R. 337). The rivet is then
inserted, cold, and in one operation the rivet expands to
fill the hole (R. 295,310, 335) and forms the head for the
rivet flush with the rim surface (R. 323).
After the accident in which the spider and rim were
separated, all of the rivets were found sheared off or
pulled through, and both the rim and spider were distorted and bent. One set of three rivets at the place
where the rim was bent and where the tire was torn are
the particular ones about which the expert witnesses for
both parties testified. At those three rivet holes on the
inside of the rim, where the heads of the rivets were
formed, there were three shiny spots. Mr. Curtis, a
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witness for plaintiff testified that in his opinion those
shiny spots indicated to him that those three rivets were
loose prior to the accident (H. 185); that thereby the
load or burden of the entire wheel was shifted to the
other rivets, causing them to shear and the wheel to fail
prior to the upset of the truck ( R. 185). On the other
hand, the witnesses for defendant testified that the
separation was caused by a heavy blow, sufficient to
distort the rim and spider, shear the rivets, and pull the
three rivets through the metal, causing the shiny spots
in the rim; that it was a physical impossibility for the
spider and rim to separate with all but three sets of
riYets holding and with one set of rivets either loose or
entirely absent; that this would be particularly true if
the truck were being driven down a highway at 30 miles
per hour; that the three or four rivet holes in the spider
and rim at the places where the shiny spots appear on
the rim show that they were expanded with the rivets in
the riveting process and were tight (R. 336-339). If the
rivets were loose there would be no expansion of the
rivet holes. There could be a loose rivet only if no heads
were formed on the rivets and the heads of the rivets
are formed only after expansion of the rivet to the full
measure of the hole and expanding the hole (R. 341) ;
that separation of the rim from the spider could not
cause the left rear of the truck to drop as much as a fiat
tirP (R. 394); that the fact of distortion of the rim and
spider shows the rivets were present and tight or there
could have been no distortion (R. 379-380). Sufficient
force to cause the distortion had to come through the
9
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rivets. The force which caused the distortion was applied
to the outside of the tire and rim. The blow that caused
the distortion and separation occurred in the accident
(R. 385, 362-363) when the truck tipped over or by
striking a boulder in the fill. That it is logical, from the
nature of the damage to the truck, that if the driver
( I\Irs. Hooper) got the left rear wheel off the road and
in the attempt to get it back slid around sideways, striking a rock or boulder off the edge of the road, which
broke the wheel, it would explain the nature of the
damage to the truck after the tip-over (R. 391). That
if the left rear end of the truck went down it would have
a braking effect and turn the front of the truck to the
left (R. 363-364). Something else had to happen to cause
the truck to tip over in the direction indicated by the
truck damage ( R. 365).
Dr. FrankS. Harris, Assistant Professor of Physics
at the University of Utah, stated that if the truck were
being driven on the highway at 30 miles per hour there
would be no separation of the rim and spider, if the
three rivets were loose or missing or even if only one
set of rivets remained so long as the truck was being
driven straight down the road (R. 408-9). To cause the
separation the rivets had to shear, overcome the press
fit, plus the cone effect of the rivet holes. To cause that
a considerable side force would have to be applied. When
a car is going down the road the forces are very small.
There has to be a side force or a sudden speed up or
slow down to cause a shearing (R. 409).
10
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:)lr. Hooper testified the wheel was in good condition
prior to the accident. (R. 67).
The numerous inspections, visual and mechanical
by both X orse Thermidor and defendant were given in
evidence and were more than ordinary. _Many of them
were l005"c. \Ye will not detail this evidence because it
is undisputed and no point is being made by appellants
that it was insufficient.
We trust that this more adequate case background
will enable the Court to more fully understand and
evaluate the rulings of the trial court.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 6
WAS CORRECT AND WAS XOT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR.
For convenience of the court we restate the Instruction:
"You are instructed that the fact that the rim
and spider were found in a separated condition
after the accident is no evidence of the fact that
they were defective, unsound or unsafe when
assembled and sold by defendant, General Motors
Corporation, nor is it evidence of the fact that
the separating of the rim and spider caused the
truck to go out of control and over turn.''
The effect of the instruction was that the fact of
separation after the accident was no evidence of: (a)
11
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that they were defective when assembled and sold by
defendant; nor (b) that the separation caused the truck
to go out of control and over-turn.
In other words, those two elements had to be established by evidence other than the fact of separation.
rrhe fact of separation after the accident was undisputed. Plaintiff was not deprived of the benefit of
this evidence for all that it properly meant, and it was
fully discussed and considered by all of the witnesses
for plaintiff and defendant. The conclusions and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light of other factors
were fully considered and discussed by the expert witnesses. The jury was instructed that they should consider all the evidence and weigh the evidence carefully
and consider it together, and give such weight to inferences from the facts proven as they should think
they are entitled to (R. 43).
That the fact of separation after the accident was
no evidence of its condition at the time o{ assembly and
sale by defendant is self-evident. They were no longer
in the same condition as when assembled and sold; they
had just come out of a truck that was almost completely
wrecked; and bore evidence of having received a heavy
blow or blows sufficient to materially distort both the
rim and spider. It makes no difference whether the distortion and shearing occurred as claimed by plaintiff or
or as claimed by defendant, the fact remains that the
condition of separation after the accident was no evidence
as to its condition at the time of assembly and sale.

12
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Plaintiff, herself, produced evidence to the contrary.
Her son testified as to the use of the truck, his numerous
inspections immediately prior to the accident and that
the wheel was in good condition (R. 67).
In arguing this point counsel for plaintiff are
attempting to read into it something that is not there,
viz., that the fact of separation was not to be considered
by the jury for any purpose. The instruction says no
such thing. It expressly says that the fact of separation
was no evidence as to its condition at the time of sale
nor as to the cause of the overturning of the vehicle. In
other words, the fact of separation would not in and of
itself permit an inference of either of those factors. It
was the instruction the court adopted for telling the
jury that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply
to those two issues.
After the accident the truck was in a damaged condition and the wheel so severely wrecked that it was no
longer evidence as to its condition before the accident.
The issues were: What caused it to be in that condition 1 When did the separation occur~ Did the separation occur before the truck upset or did it occur in the
events involved in the accident 1

t;

Those issues were all fully covered by the evidence,
argued to the jury by counsel and submitted to the jury
~~ for its determination. The instruction in question took
~-: nothing from those issues to which plaintiff was properly
,.i' entitled.

,,·:(
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rrhere is no longer any doubt in this State that a
manufacturer may be held liable for negligence in the
manufacture or assembling of the vital parts of an automobile. However, no court, so far as we are aware, has
said that the manufacturer is an insurer, that the doctrine of 1·es ipsa loquitur applies, or that there is an
inference to be drawn from the fact of the accident in
and of itself as to the cause of the accident or as to preexisting condition. Those things must be established, as
in other negligence cases, by independent evidence from
which the jury may determine whether the result (in
this case the separation of the rim from the spider)
was also the cause; whether the result was due to negligent manufacturing or whether the result was due to
the events involved in the accident, for which defendant
has no responsibility. If there are cases changing the
ordinary rules so as to make a different rule applicable
to manufacturers, we have failed to find such authority.
It seems to us, from a reading of their brief, that
counsel is in effect contending for some application of
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to this type of case from
which such an inference might arise from the fact of
separation, or are contending for a doctrine that proof
of a condition after the instrumentality has been damaged and the condition entirely changed, as it admittedly
was in this case, is evidence as to its condition prior to
the accident, when according to their own evidence it was
in good condition. In both theories they are in error.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only in
cases where the instrumentality causing the injury was

14
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under the exclusive control of defendant, which this
truck was not. It was in the exclusin.' control of plaintiff
and had been in the exrlnsive control of plaintiff and
her son since its purchase and it had been driven extensively.
There are a few cases holding that the doctrine
applies in the enclosed container cases and many holding
that it does not, and this Court has recently held that it
does not apply even in those cases where the evidence
shows that others have had the opportunity of changing
or tampering with the condition. Jordan vs. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., ______ Ut. ______ , 218 Pac. (2) 660.
In the above case this court recognized the rule that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may apply in "sealed

container'' cases as an exception to the rule requiring
exclusive control of the instrumentality. However, it
refused to apply the rule where there was evidence of
an opportunity for tampering by others. In doing so it
used the following language:
"In other words, the only time that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur should apply to a 'sealed
product' in the latter category is when the plaintiff has shou:n that there was an absence of opportunity for tampering so that in effect the court
could conclude that there was extended control
over the product by the manufacturer until it
reached the ultimate consumer, or where the
product passes directly from the manufacturer to
the consumer, without passing through intermediate hands.''

15
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In the case at bar plaintiff had had exclusive control
of the truck for approximately three months and driven
the truck extensively for more than 6700 miles and the
accident had intervened so the condition after the accident could not be evidence under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur or under any other doctrine as to its condition at the time of manufacture and sale by defendant
or as to the cause of the accident.
This doctrine has been announced by this court in
a long line of decisions from Quinn vs. Utah Gas and
Coke Company, 42 Ut. 113, 129 Pac. 362 to and including
Jensen vs. Kresse, 87 Ut. 434, 49 Pac. (2) 958.
In all other cases the plaintiff must rely, not on an
inference from the fact of injury or damage, not on the
fact of the accident itself, but upon independent evidence
of facts from which negligence may be established or
inferred. The inference does not come from the event
or incident itself in cases where the doctrine does not
apply. This is particularly true when the~uted evidence shows that the condition has been changed in the
accident, itself. It would be an anomoly in the law to
hold that a changed condition after the instrumentality
had been long in the control of others and had been
damaged by their operation, was evidence of a condition
long before the change, and permit an inference to be
drawn therefrom.
Courts have almost uniformly used and approved
this type of instruction in telling the jury that no such
16
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inference exists and that the issue of negligence must
be established by other evidence.
This Court in :Morrison vs. Perry, 104 Ut. 139, 122
Pac. (:2) 191, adopted that doetrine in the following
language:
''There is no presumption of negligence simply
because an accident happened. In this case,
negligence may not be presumed from the direction and distance of the tire marks of the respective vehicles as they approached the point of
contact. The oral evidence of time, place, distances
and circumstances were aids in interpreting the
mute marks of the tires of the respective
vehicles. ' '
The above law found expression In an instruction
very similar to the language used in this case at bar,
in Nahorski vs. St. Louis Elec. Term. Ry. Co., (Mo.),
272 S. W. 1025 where the following instruction was given:
"The court instructs the jury that the fact that
the truck and street car came together is no evidence of negligence on the part of either the
plaintiff, the driver, or the defendant, but that
the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant was negligent as set out in the other
instructions ; and unless you so find your verdict
must be for the defendant.''
In a very recent case (1950) this law was applied
to a state of facts not substantially different from those
in this case. It too was a manufacturers' liability case
in which it was sought to hold General Motors liable for
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------...
putting out a truck with a defective sleeve in the differential as a result of which it was claimed the car went
out of control and smashed into a building. Plaintiff
proved that the sleeve was broken after the accident.
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Western District, reversed the
case and directed judgment for defendant on the ground
that there was no evidence of negligence. Fisher et ux
vs. Sheppard et al, G.M.C. Truck & Coach Div., General
Motors Corp., 77 Atl. (2) 417. The truck driver testified
that he was driving on a hill when he heard a grinding
noise near the transmission and the vehicle slipped out
of gear. He applied the brakes but had insufficient air
to stop. Being unable to control the truck he crashed
into the building. As to any inference that might arise
from the fact that the sleeve was found to be broken
after the accident, the court said:
"The theory of negligence appears to be that,
notwithstanding a successful shift by Sheppard, a
defective sleeve in the differential broke causing
the gear to slip out and there was not sufficient
air pressure remaining to force the gear back
into proper position. The basis of the entire
theory is proof of a defective sleeve.
(Proof of Prior Defect)
"We are of opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to establish this basic fact. Certainly, proof
of a broken sleeve itself, in the circumstances here
presented, will not support a finding that it was
defective prior to the collision of the tractor with
the Fisher building. A finding that the break
resulted from the terrific impact is equally probable. Where two conclusions can be had from
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given circumstances, one of which would create
liability and the other negative liability, a jury
may not be permitted to indulge in conjecture and
negligence cannot be predicated thereon.''
There, as here, there was no inference from the
fact that the condition existed after the accident. In
the case at bar .Jlr. Curtis testified that in his opinion
the separation occurred immediately before the accident
(R. 186) and the witnesses for defendant testified that
the separation occurred from a heavy blow on the rim
in the accident (R. 362, 363). There was no inference
in favor of either party. The jury saw fit to believe the
evidence submitted by defendant. No one testified as ,to
the condition of the wheel when sold, but defendant
produced abundant evidence as to the method of manufacture, inspections during manufacture, and inspections
after manufacture and when being assembled and put
on the truck which completely negatived the inference
that a wheel with loose rivets could get by either at the
manufacturer's plant or the defendant's plant. (R. 292,
294, 295, 300, 317, 318, 319, 325, 326). The most that can
be said on this point is that there was a conflict in the
evidence which the jury resolved against plaintiff.
In Sennett vs. Noramtum. Coal Co., (Mass.), 187 N.
E. 758, plaintiff sought to recover damages by reason
of a wheel coming off a truck because of a broken axle.
The axle broke because of crystallization. Plaintiff
sought to recover on the theory of negligence and the
court announced the general principle that the hap19
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pening of the accident under those circumstances did
not indicate negligence.
A similar principle was announced by the :Massachusetts Supreme Court in McCabe vs. Boston Consolidated
Gas Company, 50 N. E. (2) 640 wherein it was sought to
apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to an injury
received as a result of a claimed defect in a stove which
had been in the exclusive control and operation of the
plaintiff. Under those circumstances the court held that
the happening of the accident did not warrant inference
of negligence and the doctrine does not apply. We quote
as follows:

"In this case it cannot be said that res ipsa loquitur. The situation was not in the exclusive control of the defendant. The characteristics of the
stove were determined by its manufacturer, and
its operation was in the control of the plaintiff.
Under these circumstances the mere happening of
the accident does not warrant an inference that
it was caused by negligence of the defendant."
Brooks vs. Hill-Shaw Co., 117 Fed. (2) 682. The
action was brought for personal injury sustained when
a glass coffee maker filled with boiling water and coffee
broke and injured plaintiff. She sued the manufacturer,
claiming that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied
and sought to make an inference of negligence from the
happening of the accident itself. The circuit court of
appeals of the Seventh Circuit in this case, decided in
1941, denied recovery and in doing so used the following
language:
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"\Ye agree with appellee that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur is not applicable to the facts here
presented. •\Yhen a thing which causes injury,
without fault of the injured person, is shown to
be under the exclusin.' control of the defendant,
and the injury is such as, in the ordinary course
of things, does not occur if the one having such
control uses proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation, that
the injury arose from the defendant's want of
care.' San Juan Light Co. Y. Requena, 224 U.S. 89,
32 S. Ct. 399, 401, 56 L.Ed. 680. We think this may
not be invoked to take the place of proof of a ppellant 's charge of negligence. Here we have a
utensil which had been used before-even if it
were the new one appellant received two days
before, the eYidence ·was that she had used it
several times. While she testified that she had
used the new one 'two or three times,' she also
testified that she used each one on an average of
five or six times a day. However, there was a
complete absence of proof that it was the new one
which broke. Appellant said she had no way of
telling. HoweYer, from our own examination of
the rubber gasket enclosing the fragments of the
neck of the flask, it is obvious that that gasket
had been in use many times, and was not a new
one furnished two days before the accident. Appellant testified that she had used two of the
coffee makers for over eight months, and the other
two for over four months. During that time the
utensils were under her management and control,
and appellee had absolutely nothing to do with
them.
"However, appellant argues that the instrumentality was under the sole management and control
of appellee at the time the alleged negligence
occurred, namely, when it was being constructed-
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that her charge is of negligence in the construction so that the utensil was unable to withstand
the heat to which it had to be subjected in the
normal use of it. We think this is negatived by
appellant's own testimony that it had withstood
the heat at least two or three times, and more
likely, over three hundred times. This being the
case, the thing does not speak for itself, amd
appellarnt must bring in proof of her charge of
negligence. It may be that the glass was defective, and that such defect did not immediately
disclose itself. If so, it was a matter of proof,
not of presumption."
Oklahoma Tire and Supply Co. vs. Williams, et al.,
181 Fed. ( 2) 675. This was an action against the seller
of an allegedly defective kerosene stove to recover for
injuries sustained when flames came from the oven of
the stove, injuring plaintiff and damaging the dwelling.
Plaintiff claimed in that case that the fact of the accident
was substantial evidence from which it could be inferred
that the stove was defective. Reversing a judgment for
plaintiff, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the 8th Circuit
in 1950 announced the law as follows:
''But our study of the record has not disclosed
any substantial evidence to show that there was
such a leak. The court rightly declared that the
case was not one in which the alleged negligence
of the defendant, i.e., sale of a defective leaking
stove, could be inferred from the occurrence of
the fire. The stove was long in the sole possession
and use of the plain tiffs and the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur was not applicable or sought to be
invoked. The court rightly recognized that the
burden of proof was on the plaintiffs to establish
the charge that the stove ·leaked by evidence.''
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Rotche vs. Buick Motor Company, (Ill.), 193 N. E.
529. This was an action for personal injuries to the
operator of an automobile who claimed that while he
was running his automobile at 30 miles per hour, that
the same left the roadway, struck and damaged a concrete culvert, turned over. After the accident it was
found that the right front tire and the left front wheel
were destroyed, the rear axle was bent and the top and
sides of the body were damaged, and a clevis connecting
a cable with the left front wheel was missing. It was
claimed that while operating the car he applied the foot
brake, which failed to work, and that this occurred by
reason of a defective brake. In that case, as here, he
testified that prior to the accident he experienced no
trouble with the brakes, although he had driven his car
600 miles. In that case they claimed, as here, that an
inference of negligence might be drawn from the fact of
the accident. The Supreme Court of lllinois refused to
apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and particularly
stated that the condition of the car after the wreck was
no evidence as to its condition prior to the wreck. We
quote as follows :
''The mere fact that an accident resulting in an
injury to a person or in damage to property has
occurred does not authorize a presumption or
inference that the defendant was negligent. The
burden was upon the defendant in error to prove
by competent evidence, direct or circumstantial,
that the plaintiff in error was guilty of negligence
in the manufacture or assemblage of the automobile in question. Bowman v. Woodway Stores,
345 TIL 110, 177 N.E. 727. Testimony concerning
the condition of cotter pins in the brake mechanism
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several weeks after the accident occurred without
proof that the condition of the pins remained unchanged was inadmissible and should have been
excluded. ' '
In the case at bar the evidence of plaintiff herself
was that the condition of the wheel after the accident
was entirely different from what it was before the
accident.
Harward v. General Motors Corporation, et al.,
( 1952), 68 S.E. ( 2) 855. This was a case filed against
defendant in which it was claimed that the defendant
was liable for manufacture of a Chevrolet automobile
by reason of claimed negligence with reference to a
steering gear. The facts were somewhat similar to those
in the case at bar. The driver was operating the car
along a highway and had just emerged from a curve at
a speed of 50-55 miles per hour when all at once the car
began to shimmy just a little, something it had never
done before. The driver touched the brake, something
popped which sounded like he had hit a coca cola bottle,
the car went out of control, ran off the road and turned
completely over and headed back toward the highway.
In sustaining a judgment for the defendant, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina used the following language
which is applicable to the case at bar:
''Negligence is never presumed from the mere
fact of an accident or injury. The plaintiff has the
burden of establishing by appropriate proof not
only negligence but that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury complained of. The
plaintiff must also establish by his evidence a
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

causal relation between the alleged negligence and
the injury upon which a recovery is sought. Evidence that merely takes the matter into the realm
of conjecture is insufficient. Rountree v. Fountain, 203 N.C. 381, 166 S.E. 329; Lynch v. Telephone Co., ~04 N.C. 252, 167 S.E. 847. Plaintiff's
evidence at most raises a suspicion of conjecture,
but fails to establish actionable negligence or any
causal relation between the condition of the automobile, when it was purchased and the accident
resulting in plaintiff's injury more than nine
months later."
65 C.J.S. 985, Section 220(1), Negligence:
''As discussed supra Sec. 204, it is a general rule
that negligence on the part of defendant is never
presumed but is a matter of affirmative proof;
hence, in the absence of special circumstances sufficient to bring into operation the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, discussed infra Sees. 220(2)220(11), the mere happening of an accident or
occurrence of an injury does not raise a presumption or authorize an inference of negligence on the
part of defendant and does not warrant a verdict
in favor of the injured party."
To some degree a similar situation in principle
existed in the much-discussed case of Tuttle vs. Pacific
Intermountain Express Co., ·----- Utah ______ , 242 Pac. 2d
764. In that case the Tuttle car was struck in the middle
of the left-hand side by the front of the tractor-trailer.
This could have happened in either one of two ways,
one consistent with plaintiff's theory and the other with
defendant's. This court said:
''So the fact that the Tuttle car was struck on
the left-hand side does not prove either plaintiff's
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theory or defendant's theory of how the accident
occurred.''
So in this case the fact of separation was no evidence
as to its condition at the time of sale or as to the cause
of the separation. That is what the trial court said in
its instruction.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in the
Tuttle case agree that after the ''presumptive fact''
was dissipated the parties were left to their other evidence. That is what occurred in this case. The trial
court simply said there was no inference or presumption
from the fact of separation.
In fact, although it was not requested by defendant,
the ''presumptive fact'' in the case at bar, on the basis
of Beverly Hooper's evidence that the wheel was good
and in good condition up to the time of the departure
of Mrs. Hooper from the ranch on the night of the accident, was that the wheel was good. That was in line
with both opinions in the Tuttle case. If the evidence
of Mr. Curtis was sufficient to place on defendant the
burden of going forward with its evidence, this was done
and the jury found for defendant. The fact of separation
·was no evidence as to the cause of separation or as to the
condition of the wheel when sold. All the facts were in
evidence and the most was made of them by plaintiff
throughout the case.
In addition to the foregoing authorities we respectfully call attention of the court to the following decided
cases to the same effect :
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Gibbs Y. General Motors Corp., 350 Mo. 431, 166
s.w. 2d 242.
Holgate Ys. Chrysler Corp., 279 Mich. 24, 271
N.\Y. 539.
Ayers vs. Amatucci (Okla. 1952), 243 Pac. 2d 243.
Honea vs. City Dairy (Cal.), 140 Pac. 2d 369.
Inferences may be indulged that a fact or condition
once established continues to exist. But even as to this
there are limitations, and when it appears in the evidenc€ that a change has occurred, or that the condition
is such as is likely to change, the inference disappears
as having evidentiary value.
Only in very rare cases does the rule apply to past
facts or conditions and should never be considered when
the evidence shows that there has been an intervening
change. Even where there is an inference it may be
rebutted. In this case the accident itself destroyed any
inference of the past condition even though the law were
to permit such an inference, which it does not.
The rule is well stated in 31 C.J.S. Sec. 140 under
Evidence, as follows:
''As a general rule mere proof of the existence
of a present condition or state of facts or proof
of the existence of a condition or state of facts
at a given time, does not raise any presumption
that the same condition or facts existed at a prior
date, since inferences or presumptions of fact
ordinarily do not run backward.''
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Also Dean Wigmore states the principle in Wigmore
on Evidence, 2nd Ed. Sec. 437 as follows:
"When the existence of an object, condition,
quality, or tendency at a given time is in issue, the
prior existence of it is in human experience some
indication of its probable persistence or continuance at a later period. The degree of probability
of this continuance depends on the chances of intervening circumstances having occurred to bring
the existence to an end. The possibility of such circumstances will depend almost entirely on the
nature of the specific thing whose existence is in
issue and the particular circumstances affecting
it in the case in hand. That a soap-bubble was in
existence half-an-hour ago affords no inference at
all that it is in existence now; that Mt. Everest
was in existence ten years ago is strong evidence
that it exists yet; whether the fact of a tree's
existence a year ago will indicate its continued
existence today will vary according to the nature
of the tree and the conditions of life in the region.
So far, then, as the interval of time is concerned,
no fixed rule can be laid down; the nature of the
thing and the circumstances of the particular case
must control.
''Similar considerations affect the use of subsequent existence as evidence of existence at the
time in issue. Here the disturbing contingency is
that some circumstance operating in the interval
may have been the source of the subsequent
existence, and the propriety of the inference will
depend on the likelihood of such intervening circumstances having occurred and been the true
origin.''
See also 20 Am. Jur. 208, Sec. 210, Evidence.
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Thi~

Court in JL'll~l'll Y~. Logan City, 89 Utah 347,
57 Pac. (:2) 708, speaking through l\lr. Justiee Wolfe
announced the principle in the following words:
''Certainly where a condition has existed for a
considerable length of time so as to give way to
the slow play of natural forces, or where interYening agencies not natural forces may effect a
change, no inference that the initial state was
insecure or unstable can be inferred from the
later state."
In this case plaintiff, herself, produced her son as

her principal witness, who testified that immediately
prior to the accident the condition of the wheel was good.
(R. 67). How could the fact of separation after the
accident constitute any evidence, by inference or otherwise, as to the condition of the wheel when manufactured'
The obvious answer is that it couldn't. We reiterate it
is self-evident.
In fact the inference should have been exactly the
opposite from that for which they are contending, if
there was any inference at all. In negligence cases where
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply there
is no inference or presumption of negligence. However,
when plaintiff established the fact by her witnesses that
the wheel was in good condition immediately before she
started on the trip, there could have been an inference,
under the doctrine, that a condition once established is
presumed to continue, that the wheel was good up to
the time of the accident. If there was any inference to
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be drawn it was in our favor-not theirs-and they
cannot complain.
The cases cited by counsel for plaintiff are not to
the contrary and announce no rule which made the instruction as to the fact of separation inapplicable to
the evidence in this case, viz., as to the condition of the
tire and rim when put on the truck and as to the cause
of separation.
In this case the trial court did not reject any evidence
offered by plaintiff which was germaine to the issue.
That the spider and rim were separated after the accident was in evidence. No one gave direct evidence as to
when they separated. Mr. Curtis gave his opinion that
they separated before the accident. How long before
he did not say excepting that it was his opinion that
it was immediately before. He also expressed his opinion
that the rivets were loose before the accident but he
did not say how long. This is a far cry from the evidence
in the leading case of McPherson vs. Buick Motor Co.,
111 N. E. 1050, where an expert testified that the defect
was in the wheel when it was manufactured and that a
proper inspection should have discovered it. It is very
doubtful if plaintiff made a case for submission to the
jury in this case.
We call attention of the Court to the following
questions propounded to Mr. Curtis on cross-examination
and his answers thereto (R. 236-237):

"Q. Is it possible that rivets 1, 2, and 3 could
have sheared off~
30
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A. It is possible.

Q. And what about riYet 41 Do you have any
explanation of why that one remains, or at least
part of it?
A. \Yell, if it were never properly seated in the
hole it would be in the position it is now and the
- wearing we see would be just on the shank of the
riYet after the other portion of the rivet had
sheared.

Q. You say you think a portion of that rivet
sheared, too!
A. Well, the other portion of the rivet is missing
and whether it failed by tension or shear, or some
other force, the present rivet there, No. 4, is in the
hole still and also shiny. Part of it is.

Q. All right, you say rivets 1, 2, 3, and 4 might
have sheared off, is that correct~
A. They might have. Yes sir, that's correct.

Q. Did you give any consideration, Mr. Curtis, to
the fact that the indentation on the outside of
Exhibit B is in the immediate area of rivets 1,
2, 3, and 41
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And did that mean anything to you at all!
A. In what respect~
Q. You say you gave consideration to it~ Did
that help you at all withA. Well, my thought on it was that it was due to
the wearing position of those rivets that the blow
of that magnitude evidently could have happened
at the overturning of the truck.
Q. HoweverA. Whether it is coincidental or not I wouldn't
say.
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Q. However, you didn't attach it to the fact that
rivets 1, 2, 3, and 4 might have been sheared off,
that damage~

A. Due to that deformation
Q. Yes,

there~

sir~

•

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And could whatever force caused that deformation have caused a shearing effect on those rivets~

A. It could have. It would have to be, the best
way to tell would be to make an experimental
analysis to see what type of blow, or the amount
of energy required to deform this and you could
easily calculate the value of the three or four
rivets in question and see if that blow would cause
a shear.''
That is where his opinion was left on cross-examination. It could have been loose rivets as he testified on
direct examination or it could have been that the rivets
in holes 1, 2 and 3 sheared in the accident by reason of
the blow that caused the dent in the rim and distortion
to the rim and spider. He was the only witness for
plaintiff who testified on this subject and there his testimony rested.
It seems to us that under the doctrine of Sumption
vs. Streator Smith, 103 Utah 44, 132 Pac. 2d 680, and
the long line of decisions deferred to therein, that no
cause for the jury was presented.

Defendant, in its case, supplied the experimental
analysis that Mr. Curtis said would be conclusive on that
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question. See the eYidence of Mr. Arthur Harris ( R.
355-361).
The trial court did not say in its instruction that
no inferences could be drawn from the condition of the
truck after the accident, including the condition of the
wheel. It said the fact of separation was no evidence as
to its prior condition or the cause of separation.
In the case of Kelly vs. Huber Baking Co., 145 Md.
:3~1, 1:25 ~\.tl. 78:2 cited by appellant, there were '''itnesses
who testified that the condition of the steering gear after
the accident was the same as before the accident. In
this case the opposite is true.
The case of Rotche vs. Buick Motor Co., 358 Ill. 527,
193 N. E. 529 is against plaintiff's contention here.
In Hupp Motor Co. vs. Wadsworth, 113 F. (2) 827
there was much more evidence than indicated by plaintiff. The evidence indicated there never had been a
cotter pin properly inserted in the hole, if inserted at all;
and expert witnesses so testified. The court did not hold
that the condition spoke for itself or was evidence of
itself as to its prior condition. The court did make one
remark, however, which has bearing on the case. Appellant contended a tire blew out which caused the accident.
A flat tire was on the car after the accident. The court
said:
"The fact that a tire was deflated when the car
was found in the field does not show that it was
deflated prior to the accident.''
33
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This is exactly the principle that the court applied
in its instruction to the jury in the case at bar.
General Motors Corp. vs. Johnson, 137 F. (2) 320
is relied on very heavily by appellant. Of course, the
entire record in that case is not set forth. It evidently
was a case for the jury as to faulty construction, if the
case is correctly reported. The crux of the case was that
in order to create a correct union between the axle
housing and the transmission housing there was supposed
to be a press-fit of the axle housing into the sleeve or
an opening in the bell or transmission housing. To
accomplish this press-fit the axle housing should have
been larger in diameter than the sleeve opening in the
transmission housing. This is similar to the method by
which the rim and the spider are united in the case at
bar excepting that we have four sets of rivets additional
plus the cone of the rivet holes. After the accident it
was found that the prescribed condition did not exist.
The two connections fitted loosely and upon measuring
were found to have a play of .0011". Witnesses testified
that this caused the failure. The court said this made
a case for the jury. So did the trial court in the case at
bar. No doctrine is announced that aids us in considering
the propriety of the instruction in this case where it
was admitted the accident had changed the condition
of the wheel and the fact of separation could have no
probative value in determining the cause or prior condition. Independent evidence had to be produced to
supply that evidence and the trial court held that there
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was, but the jury did not accept it. In the Johnson case

they did. That is the difference.
The other cases cited giYe no aid in determining the
question here presented for review. Appellant was permitted to fully introduce her evidence as to the condition of the truck and wheel after the accident. She was
not permitted to have such facts prove what they did
not prove, namely the condition at the time of sale or
the cause of the tip-over. Unless the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur applies, those facts had to be established
by independent evidence. There was no inference to be
had from the fact of separation. That is what the
instruction said. In and of itself the fact of separation
did not constitute evidence of these issues.
We respectfully submit that the trial court did not
err in its instruction and plaintiff was not prejudiced
in her trial.
POINT 2.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING MR. ARTHUR HARRIS TO GIVE HIS
OPINION AS TO WHAT CAUSED THE SPIDER
AND RIM TO SEPARATE.
Appellant incorrectly states that the cause of
separation of the spider and rim was the ultimate fact
in issue. The ultimate fact in issue was the condition
of the spider and rim at the time of sale of the truck
to Hyland Motor Company by defendant, viz., whether
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there was a defect at that time and if so whether it was
such that by ordinary inspection defendant should have
discovered it. The cause of separation at the time of
the accident was an issue of fact to be determined in
arriving at the condition of the truck immediately before
the accident.
Cause and effect have long been the subject of
expert evidence in the field of technical or scientific
knowledge.
Defendant was not at the scene of the accident; had
no representative there to study the case; never heard
of the accident until the suit was filed over two months
after the accident. It had to gather its facts from witnesses who knew something of what conditions were as
evidenced by marks on the highway and the physical
condition of the truck as analy~ed by experts. We have
long since learned that not only in the field of scientific
research, but also in the ordinary events of life the
tracks we make and the physical facts speak louder
than words and very often speak so much louder than
words that they destroy the word of the lone participant
in the event. Such was the case here.
No question is raised as to the qualification of Mr.
Arthur Harris to express an opinion or as to the facts
upon the basis of which he was asked to express the
opinion. Both of these factors were fully developed as
a preliminary to the question.
Counsel for appellant takes exception, however, to
the form of the question. They state that he should
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have been asked what "might" or "could" have caused
the separation instead of his opinion as to what "was"
the cause or "did" cause the particular condition. This
is at best a mere play on words, technical in the extreme
and an obvious effort to find some method of setting
aside the verdict of the jury.
They are in error in their conception of the history
of the law of evidence as applied to this subject and the
decided cases are not with their views.
Originally experts, when speaking of cause and
effect, could only express an opinion as to what in their
opinion did actually cause the condition. The courts
refused to permit them to testify as .to what ''might''
or "could have" caused it, because it was felt that such
evidence entered the field of speculation. Finally they
permitted opinion evidence as to what "probably" did
occur, and finally, in order to further broaden the field,
permitted the expert to state what "might" or "could"
have caused the condition upon the theory that it constituted some evidence on the subject and the weight
of it was for the jury.
This subject matter is discussed by Dean Wigmore
in Sec. 1976, Wigmore on Evidence, 2nd Ed., Page 198
in the following language:
"Probability and Possibility; Capacity and Tendency; Cause and Effect. A large class of cases,
embracing statements as to the probability or the
possibility of an event, the capacity or tendency
of an act or a machine, the cause or the effect of
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..
a fact, may fairly be grouped together, because
the reason why the Opinion rule is urged against
them is in general that the thing to which the witness testified is not anything which he has observed, but is a quantity which lies in estimate
only and is the result of a balancing of concrete
data. This is no sufficient reason for excluding
such statements; because it must almost always
be impossible for a witness to reproduce in words
absolutely all the detailed data which enter into
his estimate, and there can be no dwnger in receiving such an estimate from a competent witness. All that can be said of the rulings is that
probably some of them, in the final result of the
litigation in hand, have done less actual harm to
justice than others have done.
"It should be added that Courts sometimes misapply the Opinion rule to enforce the doctrine of
Torts that a recovery for future personal injuries
must include only the certain or fairly probable,
but not the merely possible, consequences; so that
the judge instead of covering the subject by an
instruction to the jury as to the measure of recovery, excludes from evidence a physician's
opinion expressed in terms of possibility only.
This attempt to control the course of expert testimony is of course unreasonable in itself. But
its unsoundness becomes the more notable when
the same Court is found ruling, in another line
of precedents, that the physician may express an
opinion as to what might have caused an injury,
but not as to what did cause it. In other words,
possibility, as affecting consequences, is tabooed,
and only actuality is to be accepted; but possibility, as affecting causes, is sanctioned, while
actuality is tabooed ...

''This is only one of the many instances in which
the subtle mental twistings produced by the
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Opinion rule have reduced this part of the law to
a congeries of non-sense which is comparable to
the incantations of medieval sorcerers and sullies
the name of Reason.''
See also the following:
20 Am. Jur. 686, Sec. 817, Evidence.
32 C. J. S. Sec. 494, Evidence.
Grismore vs. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa
328, 5 N.W. (2) 646.
Schweiger vs. Solbeck, ____ Ore. ____ , 230 Pac. (2) 195.
Empire St. Ins. Uo. vs. Guerriero, 69 Atl. ( 2) 259.
Shepherd vs. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 Ohio
St. 6, 87 N.E. (2) 156.
A question similar in principle was before this court
in Baker vs. Wycoff, 95 Ut. 199, 79 Pac. (2) 77, wherein
the medical experts were asked the direct question as to
the proper diagnosis under certain given facts. A similar objection was made that such question invaded the
province of the jury in determining the ultimate fact.
This court said the question was proper.
Generally the courts have followed the rule announced by Dean Wigmore and it certainly is sound law.
In fact, this Court in Jackson vs. Harries, 65 U t.
282, 236 Pac. 234, in approving the asking of a question
as to what "could" be the cause of a condition discussed
the general subject in almost identical terms to what
Dean Wigmore used. We quote as follows :
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"The objection is that they call for testimony
which is immaterial and incompetent. The argument is made that the experts are called because
they are supposed to be competent to express an
opinion, having probative value, as to the real
cause of the plaintiff's condition; and that, to
support the charge that defendants are responsible
for that condition, the expert opinion should be
addressed to the conclusion as to whether or not
defendants' acts were the cause thereof. If the
exzJert could not say that in his opinion the acts
complained of did or did not cause the injury, then
his testimony was without value, being mere
speculation and conjecture, and affording no basis
for an award of damages."
The court held the qualified opinion was also
acceptable. The weight was for the jury.
The fact that an expert may express a qualified
opinion does not preclude him from expressing his
opinion in unqualified terms.

POINT 3.
THE TESTIMONY OF LOWELL J. FOUTS AS
TO IDENTITY OF THE TRUCK MARK WAS NOT
HEARSAY AND NOT PREJUDICIAL.
Mr. Jim Stinnett had testifed to the location of a
certain track mark in the fill which he said was made
by the truck. He identified the location with reference
to a stake or stick in the fill. The location was established with reference to a photograph Ex. I, that was in
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evidence and used by both parties as marking the place
of the accident and ?\lr. Stinnett's evidence went in without objection. It was a matter of identity of location.
He said the marks were still there. He showed them to
~lr. Fouts. He drew the marks on Exhibit 7. Mr. Fouts
was asked if ~Ir. Stinnett showed him the place of the
mark that he was testifying to. He answered without
objection that he did. He testified that he identified the
mark and place of the accident to llir. Franklin Harris.
This was not hearsay. It was identifying the same place
after the evidence as to its being the same place had
already been put in without objection. Plaintiff and her
witnesses also identified the same place by reference to
the photograph. What ~Ir. Fouts, himself, saw at the
same spot was not hearsay. There was no dispute
as to the location. All of the witnesses identified it
with reference to the photograph and the location on
the highway with reference to physical characteristics
and surroundings. The evidence was neither hearsay
nor too remote. It is true that a winter had intervened
but the mark in the fill was still there and the location
had been established by witnesses who were present
immediately following the accident. Similar evidence
was found to be proper in Courton vs. Benjamin, 305
Mass. 489, 26 N.E. (2) 354, and Peters vs. Consolidated
Freight Lines, 157 Or. 605, 73 Pac. (2) 713; Anderson vs.
Sparks, 142 Wis. 398, 125 N.W. 925. See also Lever
Bros. vs. Stapleton, 313 Ky. 837, 233 S.W. (2) 1002.
This goes to the weight of the evidence and is largely
within the discretion of the trial court.
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Counsel for appellant says the testimony of Fouts
was corroborative of the evidence of Stinnett that there
was such a mark off the highway in the fill. There was
no dispute on that question. Beverly Hooper, plaintiff's
son, testified on cross-examination (R. 108) that it was
there immediately after the accident. He said it was
made by the truck when it was being pulled up the highway after the accident. His evidence in that regard was
not corroborated by the men who pulled the truck. The
fact of existence of the mark off the highway in the fill
was not disputed.
POINT 4.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING
THE OPINION EVIDENCE OF MR. ARTHUR
HARRIS AS TO WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED
THE SEPARATION.
Counsel for plaintiff had cross-examined Mr. Harris
extensively as to whether there was anything on the
highway that could have been an object against which
the wheel could have struck with sufficient force to break
the rivets (R. 385-390). In doing so he covered the
highway and used the photographs extensively. How~ver, he did not mention the rocks and boulders in the
fill that show on Exhibit "1 ", nor did he mention the
tracks off the highway in the fill to which Mr. Stinnett
had testified. It was upon redirect examination that he
was asked whether a rock or boulder could have furnished
that resistance.
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That is the same type of evidence that counsel says
was proper for an expert to give in his discussion under
Point 2. He opened the door to the subject matter by
going into it with the same witness on cross-examination
and asking what in his opinion was there which could
have produced the resistance force to shear the rivets
and produce the separation. One may not open the door
to that inquiry and then shut it for the other.
This type of question falls squarely within the rule
for which appellants contend as proper in the!r argument under Point 2. They now say it is improper. See
Jackson vs. Harries, supra, under Point 2.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH AND ELTON
By H. A. Rich
Attorneys for Defendant
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